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Populism has the potential to damage European democracy,
but demonising populist parties is self-defeating.
by Blog Admin
Paul Taggart assesses the challenge of populism to European democracy. He argues that
while populism can have significant negative effects on representative politics, the
demonisation of populist parties is self-defeating. Rather than tackling populism as a
concept, it is important to deal substantively with the issues raised by populist politicians,
such as immigration, multiculturalism and European integration.
In Europe, the combination of  long-term trends of  increasing distrust towards polit icians
and polit ics and an economic crisis would seem to create a perf ect storm f or populism to
sail through and establish itself  as a signif icant f orce.  And looking around, there are plenty of  examples
of  populist movements, parties and polit icians making hay at Europe’s expense. From Wilders in the
Netherlands with his anti- Islamic stance, to the Euroscepticism of  UKIP in Britain, via Jobbik’s anti-Semitic
radical Hungarian nationalism, the anti-elit ism of  Die Linke in Germany, and the anti-polit ics of  Beppe
Grillo in Italy, Europe appears awash with populism.
But in reality populism is a limited f orce and what is remarkable about the current state of  European
polit ics is how litt le populism there is. These dif f erent examples don’t aggregate into a wider populism
and it is surprising how litt le mass populism there is in reaction to the economic crisis.
To deal with what populism there is, we
need to be clear what we are talking
about. The def ining f eatures of
populism are threef old. First, populism
exhibits an antagonism to the f orms
and practices of  representative polit ics.
It builds on a f undamental ambivalence
towards polit ics in general, eschewing
established f orms of  polit ical parties
and opting instead f or the new and
spectacular and celebrating its
dif f erence f rom the established f orms
of  polit ics.  Second, populism always
draws on an implicit or explicit
heartland – a version of  the past that
celebrates a hypothetical,
uncomplicated and non-polit ical
territory of  the imagination. From the
imagination of  this ‘place’, it tends to
draw its values. And it is f rom this territory that it draws its own vision of  its natural constituency –
unif ied, diligent and ordinary. Third, populism always displays a Manichean tendency, viewing the world as
divided between good and evil, and as ‘us’ and ‘them’.
Beyond these three core f eatures there are also a number of  secondary f eatures, but these cannot be
said to be part of  the def init ion. One of  these f eatures is that it always f uses with other ideologies that
are contextually generated. This means that there is no such thing as ‘pure’ populism and it also means
that populism can vary dramatically in what f orm it takes and hence can range across the polit ical
spectrum. It means that what some take as def ining f eatures of  populism, such as celebrating ‘the
people’ or seeing elites as corrupt are, in f act, secondary.
Redef ining populism means understanding that there is nothing in appeals to ‘the people’ that is
inherently populist. Implying a retrospectively constructed ‘heartland’ with occupants who are ref erred to
as the people is a dif f erent matter. And identif ying the elite as corrupt is not essentially populist – it is a
consequence of  viewing polit ics as corrupting that def ines populism. Corrupt elites are the symptom, not
the cause. We need to look at populism with an eye to the context in which it arises and to the f orm that
it takes. We need to be clear what it is that is our primary concern. In contemporary Europe, populism has
f used with agendas of  anti- immigration, minority nationalism, Euroscepticism, anti- Islam and welf are
chauvinism.  Tackling those issues and tackling populism are dif f erent matters.
If  we want to address populism, then we need to be clear that it can have a negative ef f ect on polit ics. Its
emergence into a context tends to bif urcate polit ics there. The ‘us’ and ‘them’ language of  the populist
becomes self - f ulf illing as established f orces of ten close ranks in attempts to draw cordon sanitaires
around populist f orces. More importantly, populism has the ef f ect of  closing down debate, of  reducing it
to binary oppositions.  Hence the propensity f or advocating ‘plebiscitary’ polit ics and ref erendums – and
of  of ten celebrating the most extraordinary of  leaders to represent the ordinary people. Personif ying
polit ics is a way of  by-passing many of  the dif f icult ies of  complex issues and processes. And in these
senses populism closes down the iterative f unctioning of  representative polit ics. It f eeds an anti-polit ics
that reduces polit ics as an activity and f urther f eeds distrust in the complexity of  polit ics.
The other danger with populism is that, f rom the mainstream, we tend to lump populism in with
extremism.  But the essence of  populism is that it is distinctively not an extreme posit ion. At its heart lies
an ambivalence about polit ics, but once stirred into action, populists have clearly overcome this polit ical
reluctance. As a polit ical f orce, populism is self -consciously ref ormist rather than revolutionary. Populism
makes a point of  not challenging the f undamental rules of  the polit ical game and, in many cases,
complains that the problem is that those rules are not being f ollowed by the established polit icians.  It
works within the f ramework of  representative polit ics, adopting a posit ion that allows it to redef ine the
meaning of  the rules, but not to advocate a changing of  the game. The ‘danger’ of  populism is theref ore
that it works within existing polit ics while having the ef f ect of  changing the behaviour of  other actors.
Looking across the array of  populist polit icians in contemporary Europe and assessing how to deal with
the challenge of  those we f ind distastef ul, means we need to look closely at the context and address
the issues that they champion as well as dealing with their populism and their ef f ects. Tackling the
agenda of  anti- immigration, of  xenophobia, of  Euroscepticism and of  anti- Islam means taking on those
issues. If  we are concerned with conf ronting the anti-polit ics of  these f orces’ populism, then what
matters is the way in which we acknowledge these issues.
To succumb to simple demonisation and to exclusion means f alling prey to the dumbing down of
representative polit ics. By doing so we are in danger of  f urther closing down representative democratic
polit ics and indeed of  making ref ormist populists into de facto revolutionaries.
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